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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CONFRONTATION CLAUSE-ARKANSAS
CHILD HEARSAY EXCEPTION REGARDING SEXUAL OFFENSES, ABUSE,
OR INCEST IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. George v. State, 306 Ark. 360, 813
S.W.2d 792 (1991).
On November 2, 1989, Mrs. Paul Oliver was awakened by her two
and a half year old daughter who was having a nightmare.1 The daugh-
ter said she had dreamed of being bitten by dinosaurs the way her day
care teacher had bitten her.2 The daughter stated, "He bites me on my
tee tee," pointing to her genital area as she relayed her fears to her
mother.' The following morning the child repeated her nightmare to
her father. Later that day, Mrs. Oliver took her daughter to the Ar-
kansas Department of Human Services (ADHS), where a social worker
interviewed the child using an "anatomically correct doll." 4 Although
the daughter identified parts of the body and played with the genital
area of the doll, she did not speak to the social worker. 5
In her statements to her mother, the child referred to the day care
teacher as "Papaw George." 6 Sixty-eight year old Arthur L. George
(George) and his wife operated a private day care center in Texarkana,
Arkansas, where the child had been enrolled from approximately Sep-
tember 1988 to September 1989.1
Under the Arkansas Criminal Code, George was charged with first
degree sexual abuse because he had allegedly engaged in sexual con-
duct with someone under the age of fourteen.' On September 4, 1990,
a hearing was held to determine the trustworthiness of the victim's
statements to her mother, father, and social worker.9 The applicable
Arkansas Rule of Evidence was Rule 803(25) which provides a hearsay
exception permitting the introduction of statements made by child vic-
1. George v. State, 306 Ark. 360, 362, 813 S.W.2d 792, 793 (1991).
2. Id. at 362-63, 813 S.W.2d at 793-94.
3. Id. at 363, 813 S.W.2d at 794.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 362, 813 S.W.2d at 793.
8. Id. at 363, 813 S.W.2d at 794. The criminal statute at issue, ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-14-
108 (Michie 1987), provides that a person commits first degree sexual abuse if he engages in
sexual contact by forcible compulsion or with a person who is unable to consent because of physi-
cal helplessness.
9. 306 Ark. at 363, 813 S.W.2d at 794.
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tims of sexual abuse."0 Based on the testimony of the child, the parents,
and the ADHS social worker, the trial court found that the victim's
statements were trustworthy.1" The trial court further determined that
George's right to confront witnesses against him at the preliminary
hearing was not denied because the child had testified and had been
cross-examined.1 2
Beginning September 10, 1990, the case was tried before a jury.13
The child testified, but her testimony was confusing and at times con-
tradictory."4 On cross-examination, she was largely unresponsive to de-
fense counsel.15 After hearing her testify, the trial court determined
10. Id. The hearsay exception provides:
(25)(A) A statement made by a child under ten (10) years of age concerning any act or
offense against that child involving sexual offenses, child abuse or incest is admissible in any crim-
inal proceeding in a court of this State, provided:
1. The Court finds, in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the jury, that the
statement offered possesses a reasonable likelihood of trustworthiness using the follow-
ing criteria:
a. the age of the child
b. the maturity of the child
c. the time of the statement
d. the content of the statement
e. the circumstances surrounding the giving of the statement
f. the nature of the offense involved
g. the duration of the offense involved
h. the relationship of the child to the offender
i. the reliability of the assertion
j. the reliability-credibility of the child witness before the Judge
k. the relationship or status of the child to the one offering the statement
1. any other corroborative evidence of the act which is the subject of the
statement
m. any other factor which the Court at the time and under the circumstances
deems relevant and appropriate.
2. The proponent of the statement shall give the adverse party reasonable notice of his
intention to offer the statement and the particulars of the statement.
3. If a statement is admitted pursuant to this Section the Court shall instruct the jury
that it is for the jury to determine the weight and credit to be given the statement and
that, in making the determination, it shall consider the age and maturity of the child,
the nature of the statement, the circumstances under which the statement was made,
and any other relevant factors.
4. This Section shall not be construed to limit the admission of an offered statement
under any other hearsay exception or applicable Rule of Evidence.
1985 Ark. Acts 405 § I (codified as amended at ARK. R. EvID. 803(25)).
11. 306 Ark. at 363-64, 813 S.W.2d at 794.
12. Id. at 364, 813 S.W.2d at 794. This right of confrontation is embodied in the Sixth
Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See infra notes 27-29 and accompanying text.
13. 306 Ark. at 364, 813 S.W.2d at 794.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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that the child was incompetent and instructed the jury to disregard her
testimony." However, the court admitted the child's hearsay state-
ments as related by her mother and father. 7 The jury convicted
George of first degree sexual abuse and sentenced him to ten years.' 8
The Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's deci-
sion.' 9 Based on the United States Supreme Court decision in Idaho v.
Wright,20 however, the court struck down Rule 803(25) as an unconsti-
tutional violation of a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to confron-
tation."' Nevertheless, the court determined that the child's incompe-
tence to testify at trial did not per se invalidate the reliability of her
statements to her parents. 22 The court concluded that the victim's
statements to her mother, which she made upon awakening from a
nightmare, qualified as an excited utterance under Rule 803(2) of the
Arkansas Rules of Evidence.23 Applying factors stated in Wright, the
court determined that the victim's statements to her parents were trust-
worthy and that George's Sixth Amendment confrontation rights had
not been violated. 24 George v. State, 306 Ark. 360, 813 S.W.2d 792
(1991).
Most historians have traced the origins of the Confrontation
Clause to the trial of Sir Walter Raleigh in 1603.25 Other historians,
however, are of the opinion that there was never a recognized right to
confrontation at common law. 26 The Bill of Rights expressly adopts the
right to confront adverse witnesses. 27 The Sixth Amendment provides
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 362, 813 S.W.2d at 793.
19. Id. at 371, 813 S.W.2d at 798.
20. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990).
21. 306 Ark. at 367, 813 S.W.2d at 796.
22. Id. at 366-67, 813 S.W.2d at 796.
23. Id. The excited utterance hearsay exception involves statements relating to startling
events or conditions while the declarant remains under the stress of excitement caused by the
condition or event. ARK. R. EvID. 803(2). The court concluded that the statements were made at a
very late hour following a nightmare that truly terrified the child. 306 Ark. at 366-67, 813 S.W.2d
at 796.
24. 306 Ark. at 367, 813 S.W.2d at 796.
25. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157 n.10 (1970). Raleigh was tried, convicted for
treason, and subsequently executed. His conviction rested solely on what is now described as inad-
missible hearsay. Id.
26. See 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1397, at 158 (Chadbourne rev.
1974).
27. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. It appears that the House of Representatives adopted the
clause without debate. S. Douglas Borisky, Note, Reconciling the Conflict Between the Cocon-
spirator Exemption from the Hearsay Rule and the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amend-
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that "in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...
to be confronted with the witnesses against him."2 8 This fundamental
right is applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.29
As early as 1895, the United States Supreme Court dealt directly
with the Confrontation Clause.3" Thereafter, issues associated with the
Clause remained dormant for nearly a century. In 1970, two decisions
of the United States Supreme Court became milestones in the early
development of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation, Califor-
nia v. Green31 and Dutton v. Evans. 32 In Green cross-examination, oath
of the witness, face-to-face confrontation, and the observation of the
witness' demeanor were emphasized as the essential elements of the
Confrontation Clause.3 3 In Dutton reliability was established as the
common denominator between the exceptions to the hearsay rule and
the Confrontation Clause.3"
The general approach for determining when incriminating state-
ments admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule also meet the
requirements of the Confrontation Clause was enunciated in Ohio v.
Roberts. 5 The Roberts court noted that the clause "operates in two
separate ways to restrict the range of admissible hearsay. '3 The first
mnent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1294, 1301 n.42 (1985) (citing I ANNALS OF CONG. 15-16, 756, 767
(Joseph Gales ed., 1789)).
28. U.S. CONST. amend. V1.
29. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).
30. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895). The Court held the prior transcribed
testimony of a witness admissible although the witness was unavailable for trial due to his death.
Id. at 250.
31. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
32. 400 U.S. 74 (1970) (plurality opinion).
33. Green, 399 U.S. at 158-60. The witness's prior inconsistent statements, made at a pre-
liminary hearing, were held admissible because the witness testified at trial subject to full exami-
nation. Id. at 166-67.
34. Dutton, 400 U.S. at 89. Georgia law provided an expansive reading of the coconspirator
exception and the Court concluded that the Confrontation Clause was not violated by the use of
the out-of-court statement against the defendant. Id. at 88. For an Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals case discussing the differences between the Confrontation Clause and the hearsay rules, see
United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1356-57 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 914
(1977).
35. 448 U.S. 56 (1980). Roberts was convicted of forgery and possession of stolen credit
cards. He claimed that the credit cards belonged to his daughter. The daughter testified at the
preliminary hearing, but despite five subpoenas failed to appear for trial and could not be located.
At trial, the court held the admission of the testimony constitutionally permissible. Id. at 77.
36. 448 U.S. at 65. See Graham C. Lilly, Notes on the Confrontation Clause and Ohio v.
Roberts, 36 U. FLA. L. REV 207 (1984).
[Vol. 14:579
19921 CHILD HEARSAY EXCEPTION
involves the face-to-face requirement, providing that the prosecution
must either produce the declarant or demonstrate his unavailability.3 7
The second requires that if the declarant is unavailable, the statement
may still be admitted if it bears "adequate indicia of reliability. ' 3 Re-
liability can be inferred if the evidence falls within a "firmly-rooted"
hearsay exception or if there is a showing of "particularized guarantees
of trustworthiness." 39
The Court did not define "firmly-rooted." It did state, however,
that the solid foundations of certain hearsay exceptions allow admission
of nearly any conforming evidence while still affording constitutional
protection.4" Only those exceptions which comply with this general
standard can be properly termed "firmly-rooted." ' I Examples of excep-
tions the courts have classified as "firmly-rooted" include adoptive ad-
missions,4" former testimony,43 declarations against interest," and ex-
cited utterances.45
After Roberts, the Court continued to balance the guarantee of a
"functional right that promotes reliability" with the need for hearsay
evidence. 46 The Court recognized that literal interpretation of the Con-
37. 448 U.S. at 65. The Sixth Amendment establishes this rule of necessity. id. See Man-
cusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972). In Mancusi the former testimony bore sufficient "indicia of
reliability" to comply with the Confrontation Clause because defense counsel availed himself of
the opportunity to cross-examine the witness at the prior trial. Id. at 216. For an Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals decision espousing the importance of the face-to-face requirement, see United
States v. Benefield, 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979). In Benefield the court indicated that recollec-
tion and veracity were influenced in a real but undefined manner by the face-to-face challenge. Id.
at 821.
38. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
39. Id. The Roberts discussion implies that these are alternative methods of establishing
sufficient reliability by which hearsay can satisfy the Confrontation Clause. Id. See Lee v. Illinois,
476 U.S. 530 (1986); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). The Court stated that sev-
eral exceptions have developed over the years to allow admission of hearsay statements made
under circumstances that tend to assure reliability and thus compensate for the lack of the oath
and opportunity for cross-examination. 410 U.S. at 298-99. See also Eleanor L. Owen, The Con-
frontation Clause Applied to Minor Victims of Sexual Abuse, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1511, 1521 n.24
(1989).
40. 448 U.S. at 66.
41. Stanley A. Goldman, Not So "Firmly Rooted".- Exceptions To the Confrontation
Clause, 66 N.C.L. REV.. 1, 7 (1987).
42. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2). See State v. Marshall, 335 N.W.2d 612, 617 (Wis. 1983).
43. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1). See State v. Bauer, 325 N.W.2d 857, 863 (Wis. 1982).
44. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(3). See State v. Buelow, 363 N.W.2d 255, 263 (Wis. Ct. App.
1984).
45. FED. R. EvID. 803(l). See Haggins v. Warden, Fort Pillow State Farm, 715 F.2d 1050,
1058 (6th Cir. 1983).
46. Lee, 476 U.S. at 540. In Lee the Court reversed the conviction because the trial court's
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frontation Clause could bar the use of any out-of-court statement when
the declarant is unavailable, but the Court rejected this view as "unin-
tended and too extreme." '47 Subsequently, this balancing test took on a
whole new meaning when the Court acknowledged the necessity of pro-
tecting sexually abused child witnesses in 1982.48
In Coy v. Iowa49 the United States Supreme Court held that the
Confrontation Clause assures the defendant the right of face-to-face
confrontation with his accuser and the right of cross-examination.50
The majority found no applicable exceptions to the face-to-face re-
quirement, regardless of the costs to the victim.51 In her concurring
opinion, Justice O'Connor suggested that face-to-face confrontation
could be subject to exceptions when necessary to further an important
public policy.5 Her opinion essentially opened the door for future ex-
ceptions to the face-to-face requirement .5
More recently, in Idaho v. Wright,5 the Court indicated that the
right to confrontation is not absolute and does not prohibit admission of
hearsay statements.55 This is true even though the admission of certain
hearsay statements may indeed violate the literal terms of the clause. 6
admission of hearsay violated the defendant's right to confrontation. Id. See Daniel Shaviro, The
Supreme Court's Bifurcated Interpretation of the Confrontation Clause, 17 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 383, 384 (1990).
47. Bourjailly v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 182 (1987) (quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at
63).
48. Glove Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982). The Court recognized
that the state's interest in protecting an abused child witness might, in certain cases, justify an
exception to the Confrontation Clause requirement of the United States Constitution. Id. at 608-
09. See generally Owen, supra note 39.
49. 487 U.S. 1012 (1988). The Court in Coy held the use of a screen to separate the alleged
abuser from the child witness violated the accused's right to confront his accuser. Id. at 1022.
50. Id. at 1020. See also Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987). For more infor-
mation regarding the Coy decision, see Jaye P. Meyer, Note, Protecting the Child Sexual Abuse
Victim From Courtroom Trauma After Coy v. Iowa, 67 N.C.L. REV. 711 (1989); Ellen Forman,
Note, To Keep the Balancing True: The Case of Coy v. Iowa, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 437 (1989).
51. 487 U.S. at 1020. The majority stated that "face-to-face presence may . . . confound
and undo the false accuser, or reveal the child coached by a malevolent adult." Id. But see Mary-
land v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990); infra note 56.
52. 487 U.S. at 1022.
53. Mary A. Rittenshaus, Note, Maryland v. Craig; Balancing the Interests of a Child
Victim Against the Defendant's Right to Confront His Accuser, 36 S.D. L. REV. 104, 112 (1991).
54. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990). Wright was convicted of lewd conduct with her two minor
daughters. Hearsay evidence regarding statements made to a pediatrician by the younger minor
were admitted by the trial court. Id. at 3144.
55. Id. at 3145.
56. Id. In another case decided the same day as Wright, the Court held that the clause
permitted certain hearsay statements against a defendant despite the defendant's inability to con-
[Vol. 14:579
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The requirement of unavailability was not raised in Wright. Moreover,
the majority did not discuss that unavailability would normally be re-
quired in a sexual abuse case.57 This dicta supports the opinion of some
commentators who contend that the unavailability requirement has vir-
tually been eliminated. 58 Essentially, the Wright decision can be viewed
as an attempt to solidify the constantly changing standards that the
Court will employ when issues surrounding the Confrontation Clause
arise.
The Court in Wright concluded that child witness statements
made to third parties regarding sexual offenses would not normally fall
within a firmly-rooted hearsay exception and that more particularized
guarantees of trustworthiness must be shown. 0 The Court held that the
hearsay statements of the victim were not reliable because they lacked
certain guarantees of trustworthiness required for admission under the
Confrontation Clause.8 '
The United States Supreme Court analogized child hearsay state-
ments to other firmly-rooted hearsay exceptions in holding that only
those circumstances surrounding the actual making of the statement
are relevant to the determination of trustworthiness.82 Any circum-
stances which develop through hindsight render the utility of cross-ex-
front the declarant at trial. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990). The Court indicated that
although the Confrontation Clause did not prohibit the use of a one-way, closed circuit television
to separate the child from the accuser, the necessity for such use must be determined on a case-
by-case basis. Id. at 3169. For authoritative discussions of Craig, see Marianne T. Bayardi, Note,
Balancing the Defendant's Confrontation Clause Rights with the State's Public Policy Goal of
Protecting Child Witnesses from Undue Dramatization: Arizona Law In Light of Maryland v.
Craig and Coy v. Iowa, 32 ARiz. L. REV. 1029 (1990); Rittershaus, supra note 53.
57. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3147. The majority cited United States v. Inadi, 474 U.S. 387
(1986), a coconspirator case where the general requirement of unavailability did not apply. 110 S.
Ct. at 3146.
58. Owen, supra note 39, at 1519-20.
59. Mark J. Miller, Note, Double Exposure. The Residual Exception to the Rule Against
Hearsay and the Confrontation Clause After Idaho v. Wright and State v. Giles, 27 IDAHO L.
REV. 99, 115 (1991). For excellent discussions of the Wright decision, see Lisa M. Travis, Note,
Idaho v. Wright: A Confrontation Clause Escape Hatch for Defendants in Sexual Abuse Cases,
1.7 OHo N.U L. REV. 693 (1991); H. Jean Delaney, Note, Criminal Law-Admission of Child
Sexual Abuse Victim's Hearsay Statements Violated Defendant's Confrontation Rights as State-
ments Lacked "Particularized Guarantees of Trustworthiness," 66 N.D. L. REV. 743 (1990).
60. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3148.
61. Id. at 3150. The Court concluded that the only affirmative factors supporting the child's
statement of abuse were the lack of a motive to fabricate and the use of terminology unexpected
of a child her age. Id. at 3152.
62. Id. at 3149.
1992]
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amination marginal and should not be considered.63  Firmly-rooted
hearsay exceptions, whose reliability is based upon the circumstances
surrounding their making, include the dying declarations exception
which is based on the premise that the declarant is highly unlikely to
lie at the point of impending death."' The excited utterance hearsay
exception is also firmly-rooted, based on the belief that the declarant is
unlikely to fabricate while in a state of excitement, and, thus, there is
little possibility of confabulation.66
The Wright Court identified four factors which are necessarily re-
lated to the reliability of child hearsay statements in sexual abuse
cases.66 Utilizing various state and federal court cases to locate these
factors, the Court identified them as spontaneity and consistent repeti-
tion,6 7 mental state of the declarant,68 use of terminology unexpected of
a child of similar age,6 9 and lack of a motive to fabricate.7 Although
the Court declined to endorse a mechanical test,71 it agreed that the
aforementioned factors are applicable in determining the "particular-
ized guarantees of trustworthiness" under the Confrontation Clause. 2
The recurrent theme of each of these considerations is whether the
child declarant was particularly likely to be telling the truth at the time
of the statement. 73
Indicia of reliability result from the statement's inherent trustwor-
thiness and may not be found by referring to other evidence at trial.7 1
The presence of corroborating evidence more appropriately indicates
63. Id. (citing Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 292 (7th Cir. 1979)) (adversarial
cross-examination would not increase the statement's reliability).
64. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3149.
65. Id. See, e.g., 6 JOHN H. WIGMORE. WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1745-64 (Chadbourne
rev. 1974).
66. 110 S. Ct. at 3150. Before Coy and Craig, there were two primary questions that were
left unanswered by the United States Supreme Court. First was the matter of whether there was
an exception to the requirement of direct physical contact between the accused and the child.
witness. The second question surrounded the circumstances which would justify an exception. The
Craig court answered "yes" to the first question. 110 S. Ct. at 3166. The Wright court outlined
the answer to the second question. 110 S. Ct. at 3150.
67. 110 S. Ct. at 3150 (citing State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801, 811 (Ariz. 1987)).
68. Id. (citing Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 948 (4th Cir. 1988)).
69. Id. (citing State v. Sorenson, 421 N.W.2d 77, 85 (Wis. 1988)).
70. Id. (citing State v. Kuone, 757 P.2d 289, 292-93 (Kan. 1988)).
71. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3150. The majority in Wright also refused to create a precon-
ceived and "artificial litmus test" regarding the procedures that the child interviewers must follow.
Id. at 3148.
72. Id. at 3150.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 3149-50 (citing State v. Ryan, 691 P.2d 197, 204 (Wash. 1984)).
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that any error in admitting the statement might be harmless." The
Court in Wright stated that "[tihere is a very real danger that a jury
will rely on partial corroboration to mistakenly infer the trustworthi-
ness of the entire statement.""6 For example, medical evidence of abuse
used to corroborate a child's allegations of sexual abuse should not be
used to determine the reliability of the child's allegations regarding the
identity of the abuser."
Subsequent cases have interpreted Wright as demanding stringent
requirements regarding the admission of hearsay statements. A Sixth
Circuit case denied the admission of the victim's statements regarding
the identity of her attacker.78 The court held that the State of Ken-
tucky failed to demonstrate the statement's reliability given the stric-
tures imposed by Wright.7" The court added that Wright requires
"more than part-time reliability." 80 A Missouri court determined that
its child hearsay exception provided for even more particularized guar-
antees of trustworthiness than Wright."' In contrast, the Utah Supreme
Court issued a strong mandate in upholding the constitutionality of its
child hearsay exception in light of Wright.82 Utah's exception requires
an "interest of justice" reliability determination. 3 The court succinctly
stated that corroborating evidence can never be considered in making
such determination.
8 4
The Arkansas child hearsay exception regarding sexual offenses,
abuse, or incest was adopted by the Arkansas General Assembly during
its regular session in 1985.8" The Arkansas Legislature noted strong
policy arguments in support of this legislation.8 " It determined that
child abuse in Arkansas was of such concern that it was up to the legis-
75. Wright, I 10 S. Ct. at 3151.
76. Id.
77. Id. See Lee v. Illinois, 476 U.S. 530, 546 (1986) (the notion of selective reliability);
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 90 (1970). See also 4 DAVID W. Lou[SELL AND CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER. FEDERAL EVIDENCE g 418, at 143 (1980).
78. Sherley v. Seabold, 929 F.2d 272 (6th Cir. 1991).
79. Id. at 275.
80. Id.
81. State v. Gill, 806 S.W.2d 48, 53 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (regarding Mo. ANN. STAT. §
491.075 (Vernon 1985)).
82. State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048, 1054 (Utah 1991) (regarding UTAH CODE ANN. §
76-5-411 (1990)).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. 1985 Ark. Acts 405 § 2. See ARK. R. EvID. 803(25), supra note 10.
86. 1985 Ark. Acts 405 § 2.
19921
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lature to take corrective action.8 7 In 1987, Rule 803(25) withstood con-
stitutional challenges which claimed that the rule deprived a defendant
of the right to cross-examine and therefore violated the Confrontation
Clause."B
Other state legislatures have enacted specific hearsay exceptions
for statements of child sexual abuse victims which are similar to the
Arkansas exception. 89 However, the Arizona Supreme Court struck
down its exception as a violation of the state's separation of powers
doctrine."0 The Arkansas exception has withstood a separation of pow-
ers attack.9'
In George v. State9" the Arkansas Supreme Court struck down
Rule 803(25) as unconstitutional because it violated the defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. 3 In reaching its holding, the
court relied heavily on the Wright decision which was factually similar
to George.9" The court reasoned that to determine reliability, the hear-
say exception allowed consideration of corroborative evidentiary factors
unrelated to the circumstances surrounding the making of the child's
statement. 95 Such factors were deemed to be irrelevant and impermissi-
ble by the Court in Wright.9" Furthermore, the exception did not re-
quire consideration of several factors specifically outlined in Wright to
determine trustworthiness: 97 consistent repetition and spontaneity, the
87. Id. The emergency clause provides in part:
[Cihild abuse continues at an alarming rate in this State . . . . [limmediate steps must
be taken to deter child abusers, to expedite the prosecution of the same, and minimize
the trauma and distress of child victims ... [A]n emergency is hereby declared to
exist.
Id.
88. Johnson v. State, 292 Ark. 632, 732 S.W.2d 817 (1987), affid, 298 Ark. 617, 770
S.W.2d 128 (1989) (unavailability requirement for allowing the introduction of the child's out-of-
court statement did not apply in a child abuse case where there was sufficient indicia of reliability
of the victim's statements); Cogburn v. State, 292 Ark. 564, 732 S.W.2d 807 (1987).
89. ABRAHAM P. ORDOVER AND FAUST F. Rossi. CASES AND MATERIAL ON EVIDENCE, PRO-
TOTYPE EDITION, 625 (1991). Vermont and South Dakota have enacted such exceptions. See 1985
VT. LAWS 82 (codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 804a; § 807 (1985)) and S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 19-16-38 (1987).
90. State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d 801, 807 (Ariz. 1987).
91. St. Clair v. State, 301 Ark. 223, 783 S.W.2d 835 (1990) (The rule deals with a matter
which court rules do not cover; therefore, the rule is not unconstitutional.).
92. 306 Ark. 360, 813 S.W.2d 792 (1991).
93. Id. at 367, 813 S.W.2d at 796.
94. Id. at 365, 813 S.W.2d at 795.
95. George, 306 Ark. at 367, 813 S.W.2d at 796.
96. Wright, I10 S. Ct. at 3150.
97. George, 306 Ark. at 367, 813 S.W.2d at 796.
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declarant's mental state, use of terminology not expected of a child of
that age, and a lack of any motive to fabricate.9 8 The court followed
Wright in determining that the factors must relate to the circumstances
surrounding the hearsay declaration itself and not to mere proof of
abuse. 99 The court considered Rule 803(25)" 0 constitutionally inade-
quate on its face because the Rule included impermissible factors and
excluded relevant Wright factors.101
Despite the unconstitutional language of Rule 803(25), the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court applied the enumerated Wright factors and deter-
mined that the child's statements to her parents were trustworthy.0 2
Although Rule 803(25) authorized the trial judge to consider imper-
missible corroborating evidence, there was nothing in the record to sug-
gest that he did so.503 Also, the victim's statements to her mother were
determined to be "excited utterances," falling under the firmly-rooted
hearsay exception of Rule 803(2).04 The court recognized that hearsay
statements of unavailable witnesses are admissible only when cross-ex-
amination would be of little help to the defense.'0 5 Thus, the court
stated that admission of hearsay statements of an unavailable child wit-
ness, otherwise deemed to be trustworthy, did not violate the defend-
ant's confrontation rights."0 6
Although George may discourage prosecutors from going forward
with sexual abuse cases involving child witnesses, it is not the "death
knell" for child abuse prosecutions in Arkansas. The courts may em-
ploy both Rules 803(24) and 804(b)(5) to admit the trustworthy hear-
say statements of child sexual abuse victims."0 7 Rule 803(24) would
98. Id.
99. Id. at 368, 813 S.W.2d at 796.
100. See supra note 10.
101. George, 306 Ark. at 368, 813 S.W.2d at 796.
102. Id. at 367, 813 S.W.2d at 796.
103. Id. The court stated that a harmless error would have occurred if the trial court con-
sidered corroborative evidence. Id.
104. Id. See supra note 23.
105. George, 306 Ark. at 367, 813 S.W.2d at 796.
106. Id.
107. ARK. R. EVID. 803(24) and 804(b)(5). The hearsay exceptions provide, in pertinent
part:
Other exceptions. A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing excep-
tions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness, if the court
determines that (i) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (ii) the state-
ment is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (iii) the general pur-
poses of these rules and the interests of justice will best be served by admission of the
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apply when the child testifies because the declarant's availability is im-
material.1"8 However, when the child is unavailable to testify, usually
because the court has ruled the child incompetent, Rule 804(b)(5)
applies.'
These rules of evidence are the so-called "residual" or "catch-all"
hearsay exceptions."' They apply to statements which do not otherwise
fall within a recognized hearsay exception, yet are sufficiently reliable
to be admitted at trial."' Admission of hearsay statements via the
"residual" exceptions does not, however, automatically pass constitu-
tional scrutiny." 2 Although not deemed to be traditional firmly-rooted
hearsay exceptions, the residual exceptions require equivalent guaran-
tees of trustworthiness for admissibility.' 13 Therefore, if the court de-
termines the statement meets the Wright requirements, it may be ad-
mitted into evidence.' 1 4
In federal court, the Eight Circuit Court of Appeals has been will-
ing to admit statements of sexually abused children under the residual
exceptions to the hearsay rule." 5 State courts have also indicated an
increased willingness to use these exceptions in child abuse cases."
6
The Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that "there is a compelling need
for admission of hearsay arising from young sexual assault victims' in-
ability or refusal to verbally express themselves in court when the child
and the perpetrator are the sole witnesses to the crime.""' 7 The Ari-
statement into evidence.
id.
108. ARK. R. EVID. 803(24).
109. ARK. R. EVID. 804(a)(4).
110. See EDWARD W. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 324.1, at 907-09 (3d ed.
1984).
111. Wright, 10 S. Ct. at 3147.
112. Id. at 3148.
113. Id. at 3147.
114. Tippitt v. State, 294 Ark. 342, 344, 742 S.W.2d 931-32 (1988) (quoting Hill v. Brown,
283 Ark. 185, 672 S.W.2d 330 (1984)) (Exceptions to the hearsay rule under ARK. R. EVID.
804(5) must have "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness equivalent to those supporting the
common law exceptions.").
115. See, e.g., United States v. St. John, 851 F.2d 1096 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v.
Shaw, 824 F.2d 601 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1033 (1988); United States v.
Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439 (8th Cir. 1986); United States v. Renville, 779 F.2d 430 (8th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Cree, 778 F.2d 474 (8th Cir. 1985). But see United States v. Azure, 845 F.2d
1503 (8th Cir. 1988) (child's hearsay identification of attacker inadmissible under the residual
exception).
116. See, eg., State v. Sorenson, 421 N.W.2d 77 (Wis. 1988); State v. Robinson, 735 P.2d
810 (Ariz. 1987).
117. Sorenson, 421 N.W.2d at 84. The court further stated that "use of the residual excep-
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zona Supreme Court indicated that the flexibility provided by the
residual exceptions allows society to deal effectively with child abuse,
"an old problem that society and the law have been late in recognizing
and meeting. '""
A Colorado case, W.C.L. v. People,"9 illustrates the appeal of the
residual exceptions in child sexual abuse cases. Colorado did not have a
residual hearsay exception, and a three-year-old victim's statements
were deemed inadmissible. 20 The frustration of the Colorado Supreme
Court was eviderit. The majority stated that "[t]he facts of this case
demonstrate the wisdom of -including in our rules of evidence a residual
hearsay exception."'' The Colorado Legislature subsequently adopted
a residual exception, 2 and a later case upheld its use under facts simi-
lar to those in W.C.L. 123
Neither the Arkansas Supreme Court nor the Arkansas General
Assembly are precluded from taking affirmative action as a result of
George. In 1990, the court in St. Clair14 acknowledged the legisla-
ture's power to adopt Rule 803(25) and upheld the Rule's constitution-
ality against a separation of powers challenge.' 2 5 It follows that the
Arkansas General Assembly has the ability to amend or redraft the
child hearsay exception to conform to the Wright criteria. More re-
cently, in State v. Sypult, 26 the Arkansas Supreme Court redefined its
shared rule-making power with the General Assembly. 27 In Sypult the
Arkansas Supreme Court asserted its supremacy over the legislature to
the extent that a court-made rule's primary purpose and effectiveness is
compromised by conflicting legislation.' 28 Court-made rules include,
among others, the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure and the Arkansas
Rules of Evidence. Shortly after the Sypult decision, the Arkansas Su-
preme Court exercised its newly proclaimed power by issuing a per
tion is an appropriate method to admit these children's statements if they are otherwise proven
sufficiently trustworthy." Id.
118. Robinson, 735 P.2d at 813.
119. 685 P.2d 176 (Colo. 1984).
120. Id. at 183.
121. Id. at 182.
122. COLO. R. EviD. 803(24) (Supp. 1991). See Edward W. Stern and Jennifer K. Stern,
The Residual Exception to the Hearsay Rule: A Reappraisal, 13 COLO. LAW. 1818 (1984).
123. Oldsen v. People, 732 P.2d 1132, 1137 (Colo. 1986).
124. St. Clair v. State, 301 Ark. 223, 783 S.W.2d 835 (1990).
125. Id., 783 S.W.2d at 836.
126. 304 Ark. 5, 800 S.W.2d 402 (1990).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 7, 800 S.W.2d at 404.
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curiam order" 9 amending an evidence rule regarding the physician and
psychotherapist-patient privilege. 30 The court apparently has power to
issue a similar per curiam order creating a new, constitutionally sound
hearsay exception to replace Rule 803(25).
Mark D. Wolf
ADDENDUM
On November 11, 1991, Arthur L. George's petition for rehearing
was denied.' 3 ' The Arkansas Supreme Court issued a supplemental
opinion, however, which modified its original holding.' 32 The majority
stated that only subparagraph (I)(1) of the child hearsay exception is
unconstitutional.3 3 That subparagraph allowed a court to determine a
statement's trustworthiness by using "any other corroborative evidence
of the act which is the subject of the statement."' 34 The court further
indicated that subparagraph (m), which includes "any other factor
which the court at the time and under the circumstances deems rele-
vant and appropriate," enables a trial court to appropriately consider
the necessary Wright factors.'3 5
In a sharply worded concurrence agreeing with the dissent in
Wright,"' Associate Justice Glaze expressed his hope that the Wright
holding would be "quickly" and "mercifully" overruled by the United
States Supreme Court.' 3' The concurring opinion further stated that
"it is a matter of common sense . . . that one of the best ways to deter-
mine whether what someone says is trustworthy is to see if it is corrob-
orated by other [physical] evidence."'' 3
The dissent, arguing that the rehearing should be granted, noted
the fallacies of the majority opinion." 9 First, said the dissent, the trial
129. Per Curiam is a "phrase used to distinguish an opinion of the whole court from an
opinion written by any one judge." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1136 (6th Ed. 1990).
130. In re Proposed Changes To the Arkansas Rules of Civil Procedure And the Arkansas
Rules of Evidence, 304 Ark. 742, 799 S.W.2d 811 (1990) (per curiam) (the order amended both
ARK. R. Civ. P. 35 and ARK. R. EvID. 503).
131. George v. State, 306 Ark. 360, 374-A, 818 S.W.2d 951 (1991).
132. Id.
133. Id. at 374-D, 818 S.W.2d at 952.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 306 Ark. at 374-D, 818 S.W.2d at 952 (Glaze, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 374-E, 818 S.W.2d at 953.
138. Id. at 374-D, 818 S.W.2d at 953.
139. 306 Ark. at 374-E, 818 S.W.2d at 953 (Dudley, J., dissenting).
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court did consider subparagraph (1), the admittedly unconstitutional
provision."" Second, Rule 803(25) was never adopted by the Arkansas
Supreme Court and only it can adopt the procedural rules of evi-
dence."4' Third, ignoring the adoption issue, both the precedent of the
United States Supreme Court and the concept of federalism mandate
that the hearsay rule be held unconstitutional." 2 Fourth, the rule re-
quires only a "reasonable likelihood of trustworthiness," which is a
lesser standard than required by the Confrontation Clause.1" 3 Finally,
the dissent noted that George was convicted solely on the hearsay testi-
mony which quoted a witness who was declared incompetent."" More-
over, the dissent made the argument that if a declarant is not compe-
tent to testify in court, his out-of-court statements to a third party
cannot now be deemed competent so that they may be repeated in
court." 5
The supplemental George opinion exemplifies the ongoing struggle
between the need for hearsay in child abuse cases and the defendant's
right to confront these child witnesses. Recently, another member of
the majority in Wright retired from the United States Supreme Court
and a new Justice was appointed."6O Considering the fact that Wright
was a five to four decision, it can be anticipated that this issue is by no
means resolved. The four to three decisions of the Supreme Court of
Arkansas in George reflect the deep division of opinion on this issue.
The careful wording of the supplemental opinion has probably avoided
immediate reaction by the Arkansas Legislature to adopt the Wright
factors rather than have the courts apply them through subparagraph
(m). However, the underlying tone of the majority and dissenting opin-
140. Id. at 374-F, 818 S.W.2d at 954.
141. Id. at 374-M, 818 S.W.2d at 958.
142. Id.
143. Id., 818 S.W.2d at 957-58.
144. Id., 818 S.W.2d at 958. The dissent concluded that admitting the quoted hearsay
statement of the social worker was such a misapplication of the nonhearsay rule that it deserved
no comment. Id. at 374-G, 818 S.W.2d at 954.
145. Id. at 374-J, 818 S.W.2d at 956.
146. Id. at 374-D, n.I, 818 S.W.2d at 952-53, n.1. Justice Thurgood Marshall retired. Tony
Mauro, Marshall Is Missing-and Will Be Missed, LEGAL, Vol. XiV, No. 21, October 14, 1991,
at 6. Judge Clarence Thomas of the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit was
subsequently appointed. Terrence Moran, Power, Gender, and The Thomas Debacle, LEGAL, Vol.
XIV, No. 22, October 21, 1991, at 24-25. In 1990, Justice William Brennan, another member of
the Wright majority, retired and Judge David H. Souter of the United States Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit was appointed. Paul Marcotte, Brennan's Exit Marks End of Era, 76 A.BA.
J., Sept. 1990, at 12-13.
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ions reflects the continuing power struggle between the court and the
legislature.
Editor's Note
Subsequent to the writing of the George v. State Note, the Arkan-
sas Supreme Court once again had occasion to revisit Rule 803(25). In
Vann v. State147 the court struck down the entirety of Rule 803(25).
Writing for the majority, Justice Dudley stated that the "reasonable
likelihood of trustworthiness" standard employed by Rule 803(25) was
insufficient to meet the requirements of the Confrontation Clause under
the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Idaho v. Wright.148 In a per
curiam order 149 delivered the same day as the Vann decision, the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court adopted a new version of Rule 803(25).
In response to the George decisions, the Arkansas General Assem-
bly has also adopted a new version of 803(25).150 This legislation, Act
66 of 1992, became effective on March 20, 1992, and is more narrowly
drawn than the version of Rule 803(25) promulgated by the court in its
May 11 th per curiam order.
Whle Act 66 itself was not at issue in the Vann case, the Act does
contain on its face the same "reasonable likelihood of trustworthiness"
standard found lacking by the Vann majority in Act 66's predecessor.
It is, therefore, not entirely clear how the Vann decision and the court's
per curiam order promulgating a new Rule 803(25) have impacted the
viability of Act 66. As Justice Glaze observed in his concurrence in
Vann, "[bly their action, this court's majority members apparently be-
lieve Act 66 is not constitutionally sound. That being true, jurists
should have this thought in mind regarding cases already tried, and
now being tried, since Act 66's passage.' 51
Because the Vann decision did not expressly strike down Act 66,
however, the thorny issue remains as to which Rule 803(25) controls,
the narrowly drawn legislative version, or the more expansive court-
promulgated rule.
147. 309 Ark. 303 (1992).
148. Id. at 307-08 (quoting Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139, 3149 (1990)).
149. In Re: Addition to Arkansas Rules of Evidence (appended to Arkansas Advance Re-
ports, Vol. 309, No. 6 (1992)).
150. Act of March 20, 1992, No. 66 (to be codified at ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-41-101)
(Michie Supp. 1992).
151. Vann, 309 Ark. at 311.
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